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TELEVISING COURT PROCEEDINGS,
A PLEA FOR ORDER IN THE COURT
Wayland B. Cedarquist*
The Canons of Judicial Ethics, and many local rules of court, prohibit
the photographing, broadcasting or televising of court proceedings. Most lawyers
and judges agree this is a good rule. Most newspapers and broadcasters argue
it is grossly unfair and violates freedom of the press and freedom of speech. The
communication media are carrying on a long-range campaign to get their cameras
into court. Individual photographers aggressively seek the right to take photo-
graphs during the trial of cases, even at the risk of being held in contempt of
court. Much of the press is highly critical of any judge who refuses to permit
photographs. The issue is timely and important.
The paramount consideration is what is necessary to secure a fair trial for
every litigant. In other words, the primary concern here is with "order in the
court."
An examination of the law makes it clear that judges can exclude pho-
tographers and broadcasters; and a review of policy considerations leads to the
conclusion that judges should ban such activities in court.
I. The rules against televising and photographing were adopted, and
are almost universally accepted, as a guide to judges in their endeavor to
assure every person of his right to a fair trial.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics were originally adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1924. There was at first no canon having to do with the
photographing or broadcasting of court proceedings. It was not long, however,
before the problem arose. In 1932, a complaint was made to the Committee
on Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association that a judge in Los
Angeles had permitted a radio broadcast of a murder trial. The committee held
that this was a violation of the general principles of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
Shortly thereafter the committee introduced Canon 35 before the associa-
tion. 57 A.B.A. REP. 147 (1932).** The canon prohibited photographing or
broadcasting; it was, however, not adopted at once. It remained for the Haupt-
mann case, in 1935, to move the bench and bar into action. There were 700
newspaper men and 129 cameramen assigned to cover the Hauptmann trial.
On some occasions as many as 135 newspapermen were seated in the small
courtroom (maximum accommodation 260 persons). Hallam, Some Object
Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials, 24 MINN. LAw REv. 453, 454 (1940).
There were scare headlines; purported confessions; polls of the public on the
issue of innocence as against guilt; a moving picture camera and sound record-
ing equipment smuggled into the courtroom; and even gifts of subpoenas to
* A.B., LL.B., member of the Illinois Bar.
** At Mr. Cedarquist's request, citations of authority in this article are a departure from
the normal LAWYER form. Mr. Cedarquist's authorities will be cited in the text of the article,
rather than in footnotes. (Ed.)
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some persons who wanted to be sure of getting into the courtroom. See the
Hallam Report on the Hauptmann Case, published as an Appendix in Id. at
477-508.
The reaction to these excesses was immediate and widespread. One of the
results was the creation of a Special Committee on Cooperation between the
press, radio and bar, which in 1937 reported, "We are . . . unanimous in be-
lieving that all extraneous influences which tend, or may tend, to create favor,
prejudice or passion should be eliminated." Another result was the adoption
of Canon 35 by the American Bar Association, without dissent, on September
30, 1937.***
It is clear that Canon 35 was adopted because lawyers and judges were
convinced that the public interest was best to be served by seeking to preserve
those things which make for a fair trial and excluding those things which make it
difficult to have a fair trial. It is clear that they considered it essential that
there be an impartial and able judge, a jury free from prejudice, honest and
aggressive counsel, and as dignified a forum as possible. Trained in the Anglo-
American way of hearing cases, they knew that whatever justice and truth was
to be found, would be found in those few hours in the courtroom or not at all.
To them, the courtroom was the fulcrum on which rested the scales of justice.
To introduce any element which did not bear on the business at hand was to
disturb that fulcrum and to endanger the cause of justice. To permit pho-
tographers in the courtroom was to introduce an element which not only had
nothing to do with the case at hand but which was likely to distract attention,
upset already nervous witnesses, increase tensions inside and outside the court-
room, and, in extreme cases, turn the whole proceedings into a circus. The
general public and the press itself disapproved these results. The judges and
lawyers, whose special skills were devoted to seeing that justice be done, there-
fore adopted Canon 35 to be a guide to the trial judges in their endeavor to
provide a fair trial to every litigant. Philbrick McCoy, The Judge and Court-
room Publicity, 37 J. Am. JUD. Soc. 167-181 (1954).
Canon 35, in the years since its adoption in 1937, has been officially adopted
and incorporated verbatim in the rules of court in about 16 jurisdictions. 37
J. Am. JUD. Soc. 149, 150 (1954). It has been adopted as a canon of judicial
ethics by bar associations in about 10 other jurisdictions. Id. at 150. In 1948,
the United States Supreme Court adopted Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of
*** Canon 35 of The Code of Judicial Ethics:
35. Improper Publicizing of Court Proceedings.
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and de-
corum. The taking of photographs in the court room, during sessions of the
court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting or televising of
court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of
the proceedings, distract the witness in giving his testimony, degrade the
court, and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the
public and should not be permitted.
Provided that this restriction shall not apply to the broadcasting or
televising, under the supervision of the court, of such portions of naturaliza-
tion proceedings (other than the interrogation of applicants) as are de-
signed and carry out exclusively as a ceremony for the purpose of publicly
demonstrating in an impressive manner the essential dignity and the serious
nature of naturalization. (Ed.)
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Criminal Procedure, prohibiting photographs or broadcasting of court proceed-
ings. The United States District Courts in eight jurisdictions have officially
adopted the canon as a local rule of court (Id. at 150-151), and the great ma-
jority of district courts in other jurisdictions follow it as an unwritten rule of
conduct. Most Illinois courts have adopted such a rule as part of their local
rules of practice (e.g., Rule 40 of the Rules of the Circuit Court of Cook
County). Moreover, the trial courts of many other states have adopted a similar
rule; and even where the courts have not adopted a formal rule, the principle
embodied in Canon 35 is generally observed as a matter of custom and good
sense.
In 1952, after the Kefauver Committee allowed the televising of com-
mittee hearings, and after the television media began to ask permission to tele-
vise court proceedings, the American Bar Association appointed a special com-
mittee to study Canon 35. The committee submitted a full appraisal of the
subject and recommended that Canon 35 be amended to prohibit televising of
court proceedings. The association approved the recommendation and amended
the canon. 77 A.B.A. REP. 607 (1952).
II. The judges, under the Constitution, statutes and decided cases, dearly
have power to prohibit photographs, broadcasts and telecasts of court
proceedings.
The campaign of the communication media to get their cameras and
microphones into court has been devoted, in large part, to a search for some
precedent in the law which could be said to give them a legally enforcible right
to carry on such activities in the courtroom. What is the law?
A. Every trial judge has power to control the conduct of proceedings
before him, including power to exclude photographers and broadcasters.
The starting point, in any discussion of the law applicable to this problem,
as well as in any discussion of the judicial ethics involved, must be that it is the
business of the courts to serve the public interest by assuring a fair trial to all
litigants. It is stated in 53 Am. JUR., Trial, § 34, pp. 49-50:
It is within the province of trial courts, in the exercise of sound dis-
cretion, to regulate the course of business during the progress of
trials.... In the trial judge is vested the power and duty of preserv-
ing order, enforcing obedience to lawful orders and process, and
controlling witnesses and the conduct of counsel, and all necessary
precautions must be taken to insure a fair and impartial trial.
In the recent case of State v. Clifford, 118 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio Ct. App.
1954), affid 123 N.E.2d 8 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1954), cert. denied 349 U.S. 929
(1955), the trial judge told a press photographer that he would not permit
photographs to be taken during the arraignment of a man indicted for em-
bezzlement. The photographer defied the judge and took a picture. The judge
held the photographer in contempt. The judge's order was upheld in turn by
the Appellate Court and the Supreme Court of Ohio, and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari. The Ohio Appellate Court said (at 118 N.E.
2d 855-56):
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A Judge is at all times during the sessions of the court empowered
to maintain decorum and enforce reasonable rules to insure the
orderly and judicious disposition of the court's business....
Under the undisputed evidence in this case, the rule against taking
photographs in a courtroom while the court is in session has much
support. Such a rule is in force in all of the Federal Courts of the
United States, is clearly stated in the Canons of Judicial Ethics of
the American Bar Association, and is recognized as necessary court-
room decorum by many state and local Bar Associations and by a
great many individual judges of state courts. It is therefore impos-
sible for this court to hold that the trial court, in promulgating the
rule against photographs . . . abused its discretion....
When the court is in session it is under the complete control of the
judge, whose directions, reasonably necessary to maintain order and
prevent unnecessary disturbance and distraction must be obeyed.
Deliberate disobedience of such orders constitutes a contempt of
court punishable under statutes of this state.
Two of the many cases in accord with this result are Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md.
121, 136 Atl. 312, 51 A.L.R. 356 (1927); and Re Seed, 140 N.Y. Misc. 681,
251 N.Y.S. 615 (1931).
In other words, the law today is clear on the point that every trial judge
has power to conduct the proceedings in his court so as to assure a fair trial.
If the presence of photographers and broadcasters is likely to interfere with a
fair trial, which most judges believe to be the case, the trial judge can prohibit
photographing, broadcasting or televising.
B. Photographers and broadcasters have no legally enforcible right to
bring their cameras and microphones into the courtroom.
It is dear, from the Clifford, Sturm and Seed cases, that photographers
and broadcasters have no legally enforcible right to carry on the activities of
their professions in the courtroom. The media insist, however, that there is
such a right. Their argument is based on several grounds.
1. The "free speech" argument: The media argue that the guarantee of
freedom of speech by the first and fourteenth amendments of the federal Con-
stitution gives them the right to broadcast court proceedings. No court, how-
ever, has yet seen fit to hold that the right of free speech is involved to such
an extent as to give the media a legally enforcible right to bring their cameras
and microphones into court. The reason is obvious and basic. There are two
fundamental sets of rights involved - the right to a fair trial and the right to
free speech. Neither of the two sets of rights is absolute, and in the event of
conflict, one or the other must give way. In the present situation, while it is
recognized that the public should have the fullest information about the courts,
it is more important that every litigant have a fair trial. The rights of the indi-
vidual person to a fair trial are of such paramount importance as to require
the most scrupulous attention and protection. Mr. Justice Frankfurter eloquently
pointed this out in his short statement (denying certiorari) in Maryland v.
Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1949):
It has taken centuries of struggle to evolve our system of bringing
the guilty to book, protecting the innocent, and maintaining the
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interests of society consonant with our democratic professions. One
of the demands of a democratic society is that the public should
know what goes on in the courts by being told by the press what
happens there, to the end that the public may judge whether our
system of justice is fair and right. On the other hand, our society
has set apart court and jury as the tribunal for determining guilt
or innocence on the basis of evidence adduced in court. . . .It
would be the grossest perversion of all that Mr. Justice Holmes
represents to suggest that it is also true of a criminal charge "that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market." . . . Proceedings for the
determination of guilt or innocence in open court are not in com-
petition with any other means for establishing the charge.
It is submitted that, between the two sets of rights, the right of an indi-
vidual to a fair trial must prevail if our democratic principles, which arise from
our belief in the dignity and worth of the individual citizen, are to prevail.
2. The "free press" argument: The media also argue that the first amend-
ment guarantee of freedom of the press gives press photographers an enforcible
right to photograph court proceedings. They argue that their right to comment
on the case includes a right to photograph it. This argument must fail because
photographs are not essential to a statement of what goes on in court in any
particular case. Moreover, the same reasons, which led to the conclusion that
the right to a fair trial must prevail as against an assertion of freedom of speech,
apply here and lead to the conclusion that it must prevail over an assertion of
freedom of the press. The courts have accordingly held that freedom of the
press is not involved. The New York Appellate Court expressly so held in
United Press Association v. Valente, 281 App. Div. 395, 120 N.Y.S.2d 179
(1953). Accord: State of Ohio v. Clifford, supra; Ex parte Sturm, supra.
3. The "public trial" argument: The media further argue that the public
has a right to be present at all court proceedings; and that the photographers,
broadcasters, and telecasters, as members of the general public, share in that
right. It is true that the sixth amendment of the federal Constitution, and the
constitutions of 41 states, require that criminal trials be open to the public. See
Comment, A Public Trial, 4 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 38 (1954). As a matter
of fact, all trials are now public by law or custom except where attendance by
the public (including the media) might affect public morals, health or safety.
However, many courts have held that this right is one which belongs to the
defendant alone, in a criminal case, and not to the general public nor to the
media of communication. United Press Association v. Valente, supra. This
is the majority rule. And, even if the right to a public trial can be said to be
a right belonging to the general public, as was held in E. W. Scripps Co. v.
Fulton, 125 N.E.2d 896 (Ohio App. Ct. 1955), it is far from being an absolute
right. There are statutes in 40 states authorizing or requiring the exclusion of
the public in certain classes of cases, more particularly rape cases and cases
involving minors. 6 WIGMOR., EvmENCE § 1835(1) (3d ed. 1940). These
statutes have generally been held to be constitutional. Moore v. State, 151 Ga.
648, 108 S.E. 47 (1921); and see Notes, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 395 (1950) and
49 COLUM. L. REv. 110 (1949). Moreover, the judges themselves, even in the
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absence of statute, clearly have power to exclude persons whose presence is apt
to make it difficult to have a fair trial. State of Ohio v. Clifford, supra. The
media quote Wigmore's arguments as to the values of public trials (improve-
ment of the quality of testimony, and so on) as though these values justified
an extension of the courtroom into every living room by way of television.
Actually Wigmore took no such extreme position. He clearly stated, 6 WiGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1835 (3d ed. 1940), that:
All the reasons for requiring publicity are of a contingent... nature.
In the long run . .. no tangible and positive advantage is gained
for a party in a given case by publicity or lost by privacy. Moreover,
since the whole community cannot enter, the exclusion of some who
might have entered does no definite harm. Finally, in certain con-
ditions, the advantages may be overbalanced by disadvantages.
The rule therefore need not be absolute and invariable. Exceptions
may properly be recognized. It is an excess of sentimental obstinancy
to deny the propriety of allowing exceptions.
Wigmore believed exclusion was in order when there was a risk of mob
violence, or the possible moral harm of satisfying pruriency in certain cases,
or danger of overcrowding, or the likelihood that the attendant publicity might
turn the trial into a circus. Wigmore approved of the statement of Judge Walker
in State v. Saale, 308 Mo. 573, 274 S.W. 393 (1925), affirming the action of a
trial judge who, faced with a courtroom in which every seat was occupied, order-
ed the sheriff not to admit any more spectators (cited at 6 WIGMORE, EVmENCE
§ 1835 [3d ed. 1940]): "The publicity enjoined by organic laws must, in the
administration of justice, be subordinated to reason."
Were Wigmore alive today, he would undoubtedly approve of the use
of Canon 35 as a guide. The media have elaborated on the "public trial"
argument to the point where it might almost seem that John Lilburne made
his famous attack on Star Chamber proceedings in the England of 1649 for
the sole purpose of assuring newsmen and their heirs of a "right of access" to
court proceedings. Nothing could be farther from the truth. John Lilburne
was a cantankerous and obstinate individualist who was insisting on his right
to a fair and public trial. And this, essentially, is what the right to a public
trial means today; it is the right of the individual defendant in a criminal case
to have enough of the public present to assure that he is fairly tried and judged.
4. The "equality of access" argument: Some of the communication
media, particularly the broadcasters, argue that there is unlawful discrimination
when newspaper reporters are admitted to court but not television cameras
and microphones. The complete answer to this argument is that the broadcasters
and photographers have just as much access to the courtroom as anyone else.
They can attend in person. They can observe and later tell others what went
on. They can "gather and disseminate the news." They, however, are not satis-
fied with this; they want more; they want to bring cameras and microphones
with them. A logical extension of this argument would be to say that every
courtroom spectator has a legally enforcible right to bring his camera with him
and take pictures. It is, of course, clear that what each of the media wants
is not "equality of access" but "access to carry on my business in the courtroom."
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Another answer to this is that no court has yet been persuaded to hold that
there is any such right. To the contrary, it has been held in one case, where
a trial judge allowed only one radio broadcaster to put his microphone in the
courtroom, that another broadcaster had no basis to claim that such violated
his federally guaranteed civil rights. Anthony v. Morrison, 83 F. Supp. 494
(S.D. Cal. 1948); afl'd 173 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1949); cert. denied 338 U.S.
819 (1949). The "equality of access" argument is of interest, however, in that
it reveals the keen competition which exists between the various parts of the
communication profession. No one of the media will content itself with staying
outside the courtroom if other media members are permitted inside; all want
the same chance at "coverage." This indicates some of the problems which
are certain to be encountered by a trial judge in any sensational case. The
media have argued that they can avoid part of this problem by "agreeing" to
pool their resources in such a case and entrust them to some one team of camera-
men; but the philosophy and practice of free enterprise in the newspaper, radio
and television fields (as well as the history of their conduct at most sensational
trials in the past) makes it clear that, when the competition is keen, it will be
difficult to get the media to agree on anything, and that, in any event, a "pool-
ing agreement" will be a slender reed on which to rely.
5. The Colorado Case: The Colorado Supreme Court, in 1955, held
hearings to determine whether it should modify its rule patterned after Canon
35. In February, 1956, it adopted a recommendation that the rule be modi-
fied. The modified rule provides that it is up to the trial judge in each case to
decide whether to permit photographing or broadcasting, provided that no wit-
ness or juror in attendance under subpoena shall be photographed or broadcast
over his objection. 296 P.2d 465(1956). The media have hailed this as a vic-
tory for their point of view. Actually it is no victory for the media; it merely
confirms the arguments set forth in this article, namely, that the trial judge
has the right to ban these practices and the media have no legally enforcible
right to bring their cameras and microphones into court. The only difference
between Canon 35 and the Colorado rule is one of emphasis; and, on this
point, most courts have ruled that they prefer to follow Canon 35 verbatim. See
In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956). The Arizona Supreme Court
adopted Canon 35 verbatim, after argument, in December 1956; and the West
Virginia Supreme Court, in March, 1956, after argument and briefs,
amended its Canon 35 to include a ban on broadcasting. The reason.
these other courts prefer Canon 35 to the Colorado rule is clear. The new
Colorado rule, by requiring the trial judge to rule on photographing and broad-
casting in each case, subjects the trial judge to the combined pressures of two
of the most vocal parts of the community, namely, the newspapers and broad-
casters. This, in addition to the other duties of the trial judge, places too great
a burden on him. Most state supreme courts, therefore, prefer to assume the
responsibility for stating, as a valid exercise of the rule-making power of the
courts, over judicial proceedings, that photographing and broadcasting shall
not be permitted.
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III. The Judges not only can, but should continue to follow the rules
against photographing and televising cour trials. Those rules are as good a
guide for assuring fair trials today as they were when adopted.
The campaign of the communication media is not limited to arguments
about the law. They have also attacked Canon 35 and related rules on the
ground that they are outmoded and no longer have any basis in fact. What
are the facts?
The argument of the communication media is that Canon 35 and re-
lated rules were adopted at a time when the physical equipment of the photo-
grapher and broadcaster was both bulky and noisy; today the equipment is
quiet and can be almost completely concealed; therefore the rules are outdated
and unnecessary. It is submitted that this argument misses the point. The rules
were adopted not merely because the cameras and microphones were a physi-
cal bother but just as much, if not more, because they created psychological
distractions. To the extent that human nature on the American scene has re-
mained pretty much the same over the last two decades, to that extent the
rules are as up-to-date and necessary as ever.
It is conceded that there have been tremendous technological changes in
this field in the last several years. It is common knowledge that today there
are high-speed still cameras with fast film, which not only do not need flash
bulbs to take pictures indoors but which are so small they fit in the palm of one's
hand. There are moving picture cameras with mechanisms so quiet they can't
be heard a few feet away. There are television cameras sensitive enough to
transmit a picture from a darkened room lit only by one candle. It is possible
to construct an auditorium so that radio and television transmission can be
carried on with a minimum of disturbance - witness the General Assembly of
the United Nations.
The fact remains, however, that the Anglo-American system for getting at
the truth in court is still the same. It is still our notion that the best way of
securing justice in the trial of a case is to have an impartial judge, and a jury
free from prejudice, sitting in judgment on facts brought before them by the
adversaries. The best way to get at the truth is to have the adversaries bring
their witnesses into court, put them under oath, and then examine and cross-
examine them. The best way to do this fairly in any case, be it a murder trial,
a divorce proceeding, a personal injury action or a minor traffic charge, is to
concentrate on the business at hand and, so far as possible, to exclude every
outside influence.
Viewed in this perspective, have the facts so changed that the rules against
photographing and televising are out of date?
What about the judges? The rules were adopted in the belief that pho-
tographers and broadcasters were likely to distract the judge from the business
at hand by requiring him to devote considerable attention to special arrange-
ments and to the settling of disputes between competing photographers and
broadcasters. As a matter of fact, this problem is considerably more acute to-
day than it was at the time of adoption of Canon 35 in 1937. The tremendous
growth of the communication media and the keen competition between them
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today would greatly add to the burdens of the trial judge, who would inevita-
bly be confronted with persistent demands for space and for equal time.
What about the newspapers and press photographers and telecasters?
Have they changed? The rules were adopted in the belief that the communi-
cation media would usually be most interested in covering those cases which
would attract the largest audience; that such cases were apt to be the ones
most charged with emotion in the first place, and therefore most in need of
an impartial judge and jury; that, if photographing and broadcasting were
permitted, the tension within the courtroom would mount, and the general
public would become so aroused that waves of emotion would roll back into
the courtroom from outside: and that all this would make it difficult, if not
impossible, to secure a fair trial for the parties. Times have not changed so
much as to make it unlikely that these things will happen again. The communi-
cation media are as interested as ever in sensational cases. The Sheppard mur-
der trial in Ohio attracted over 70 newspapermen and 50 press photographers.
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The media argue that they themselves have changed and that they now
want only to educate and inform the public. The fact of the matter is that the
media are still in business for profit. They are necessarily governed by consider-
ations such as amount of circulation and number of listeners or viewers. The
officers and directors of the various media are directly responsible to their share-
holders to see to it that the companies are so run as to make a profit. Although
the media would like to cover ordinary cases and thus inform the public how
tle courts work, they will inevitably concentrate their efforts on the sensational
cases. And these are the very cases most in need of a fair and impartial judge
and jury.
What about the witnesses? The rules were adopted in the belief that Wit-
nesses, already nervous at the prospect of what would very likely be their one
appearance on the witness stand in a lifetime, would be made apprehensive
and tense at the prospect of having photographs taken and broadcasts made of
their testimony. The behavior of the average person has not changed so much
that he can pose for press photographers or appear on a telecast with ease.
People still grow tense and nervous when being photographed. They feel that
way, not so much bcause of the paraphernalia, although this has some effect,
but principally because of the knowledge that the photograph or telecast will
be looked at by a vast audience. Whatever the result of this tension, whether
it makes the person's mind go blank or induces him to put on an act, it is not
conducive to close attention or truth-telling. These tensions, arising from
activities that have nothing directly to do with the judicial system itself, but
which are even likely to interfere with the judicial process, should be eliminated.
The entire story of the evolution of trial by judge and jury teaches that we
are most likely to get at the truth by concentrating on the testimony of wit-
nesses under oath and eliminating all outside influences. We know that trial
by wager of battle was no way to settle disputes. We know that trial by ordeal
of fire or water was based on superstitution and not related to the issue of
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where the truth lay. We should not now substitute a new form of trial, trial
by ordeal of camera, for trial by judge and jury.
Can we prove what we say about the witnesses? The media claim that
an impartial scientific study would show that witnesses are not seriously affected
by the presence of cameras or television. In 1956 your author began research
along this line. Starting with the Journal of Psychological Abstracts, it became
clear at once that there was not too much written on the subject, although there
appeared to be some studies on the psychology of testimony, the elements of
error in testimony, and so on. However, your author was brought up short by
some observations in 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, The Science of Judicial Proof, § 296
(3d ed. 1937). Wigmore discusses scientific studies of the extent of testimonial
error. He raises the question whether it is at all scientifically possible for there
ever to be an accurate study of the degree of error in testimonial evidence.
Wigmore concludes that it is doubtful whether such a study is possible, because
there is generally no way of establishing the objective facts of a litigated matter
other than by way of a trial; and to substitute "a staged trial" for a real trial
affords no basis for scientific conclusions. Wigmore states:
When the testimonial scientist desires to observe the effect of a type
of event upon the truth-telling narration of three hundred witnesses
under oath in court, half of whom have been formerly convicted
of forgery and half have not been, he cannot himself know what
the truth of the event was in those three hundred cases; and it is
only by the known objective truth of the case that the correctness
of their utterances can be tested and the tendency of a forger to lie
can be measured. Perhaps in half a dozen cases out of the three
hundred he might satisfy himself on the actual event, as his basis
for testing. But in all the rest, he can only establish the fact-test
by listening to the other witnesses (for whom he has as yet no test),
or by laboriously checking the facts by outside inquiry of his own,
and here again he lacks a basis for checking. In short, it can only
be by a long series of years of observation, gradually accumulating
enough cases in which an objective truth-basis was known at the
start, that the data would be ripe for generalization. 2 WIGMORE,
EvrDENCE § 296 (3d ed. 1940), at 692-93.
In view of this, it appears to the author that no scientific answer can readily
be found to this problem. The matter must be resolved largely by value judg-
ments, based upon common human experience and related to the aims sought to
be achieved by our society.*
Conclusion
What are the values deemed most important by our society? Trials with
or without television?
The society which deems it wise that the fights of individuals, with each
other and with their government, be heard by judge and jury, with witnesses
brought before them by the adversaries; to get at the truth, so far as possible,
by examination and cross examination; and to make every effort to achieve
justice by this means, and thereto abide the result - that society will choose
* For a discussion of the position of the American Civil Liberties Union on the problem
of televising court proceedings, see Bok Review, 36 NoaE DAME LAWYER 239 (1961). (Ed.)
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to have the matter so arranged that, subject to all human frailties, the judge
and jury can nevertheless concentrate on the business at hand and try to reach
for the truth, within the framework of our judicial system.
The society which chooses to televise the trials; to interest the greatest
number of people; and to bring the testimony of witnesses into millions of
homes and other viewing places - that society, by letting a trial become a
spectacle, turns the entire matter into a public issue, subject to being resolved,
not by judge and jury alone, but by judge and jury pressured by the most
excited and aroused part of the public. This way could lie dictatorship and
anarchy. Witness the "trial" after the Reichstag Fire and the recent televised
Cuban "trials." Mr. Justice Douglas, in an address delivered at the University of
Colorado Law School, on May 10, 1960, The Public Trial and the Free Press,
observed, "was it not Juvenal who wrote 'Two things only the people anxiously
desire - bread and circuses'?"
Is our society concerned to have "order in the court"?
